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Abstract
This study assesses ﬁve common explanations for the large decline in U.S. total
factor productivity (TFP) during the Great Depression: changes in capacity
utilization, factor input quality, and production composition; labor hoarding; and
increasing returns to scale. The study ﬁnds that these factors explain less than one-
third of the 18 percent TFP decline between 1929 and 1933. The rest of the
decline remains unexplained. The study offers a potential explanation: declines in
organization capital, the knowledge ﬁrms use to organize production, caused by
breakdowns in relationships between ﬁrms and their suppliers, for example. As
some ﬁrms failed during the Depression, efficiency in surviving ﬁrms decreased;
managers had to shift time away from production in order to establish new
relationships, and ﬁrms had to shift to unfamiliar technologies that initially were
operated inefficiently. This article originally appeared in the American Economic
Review. © 2001 by the American Economic Association.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.The Great Depression brought a striking short-run produc-
tivity change to the U.S. economy. Between 1929 and
1933 in the United States, real output per adult fell more
than 30 percent, and total factor productivity (TFP)—
changes in output not accounted for by changes in mea-
sured inputs—fell about 18 percent. This TFP decrease is
much larger than expected from just extrapolating the TFP
decreasethattypicallyhasoccurredduringpostwarU.S.re-
cessions. During the average postwar downturn (between
1947 and 1992), output has fallen about 2 percent and TFP,
0.3 percent. This relationship suggests that TFP should
have fallen only about 4–5 percent during the Depression,
rather than 18 percent. It is unlikely that this decrease is
duetotechnologicalregress,whichisthesimplestinterpre-
tation of this productivity change. If that is not the cause,
however, then what is? The Depression remains one of the
most important and enduring mysteries in macroeconom-
ics, and identifying the causes of this productivity decrease
may shed new light on this mystery.
Here I present productivity data from the Depression
andassesshowmuchoftheTFPdecreasecanbeexplained
by ﬁve commonly suggested factors: two types of errors in
themeasurementofinputs—changesincapacityutilization
and in the quality of factor inputs—plus three other fac-
tors—changesinthecompositionofproduction,thehoard-
ing of labor, and increasing returns to scale. I ﬁnd that all
of these factors combined explain less than one-third of the
18 percentdecrease. Iconclude by suggestingthat decreas-
es in organization capital (the knowledge ﬁrms use to or-
ganize production) may be a promising candidate for ex-
plaining the productivity decrease. But as yet that decrease
remains a tantalizing puzzle.
Factor Mismeasurement?
My analysis uses John Kendrick’s (1961) TFP measure,
which is the ratio of real gross national product (GNP) to
an index of total factor input. This input measure is a
factor share–weighted average of aggregate capital input
and labor input. Table 1 shows Kendrick’s 1930–33 val-
ues for the TFP measure, output, capital, and labor relative
to their values in 1929. According to this measure, TFP
fell throughout the Depression and was about 18 percent
below its 1929 level in 1933.
I begin my analysis by estimating how much of the pro-
ductivitydecreaseisduetofactormismeasurement.Micro-
economic studies indicate there were changes in capital
utilization and in the average quality of capital and labor
inputduringtheDepression.Capitalutilizationfell,andthe
average quality of employed capital and labor rose as the
least productive inputs were idled. These changes are not
all captured in Kendrick’s TFP measure, so I adjust his in-
put measures to take account of them.
Adjustingcapitalinputrequiresestimatinghowmuchof
the capital stock (measured in efficiency units) was idle
during the period. Since there is no standard aggregate
measure of idled capital, I estimate it using manufacturing
data from the work of Timothy Bresnahan and Daniel Raff
(1991). They report that the number of active manufactur-
ing plants fell one-third between 1929 and 1933. There are
at least three reasons, however, that one-third is too large
an estimate of the fraction of the aggregate capital stock
idled. First, the manufacturing sector contracted more than
averageintheperiod1929–33,whichsuggeststhatagreat-
er fraction of its capital was idled than the capital in other
sectors.Second,theidledplantstendedtobemuch smaller
than the plants that remained active (Bresnahan and Raff
1991).Third,the idledplantstendedto betheleastproduc-
tive plants (Bresnahan and Raff 1991). This indicates that
the idled plants (measured in efficiency units) were much
smaller than the operating plants. While a detailed analysis
of idled capital is beyond my scope here, these three facts
suggestthatthefractionoftheaggregatecapitalstockidled
is much less than one-third. For this study, I assume that
the fraction idled is 20 percent.
I next examine changes in the average quality of labor
input during the Depression. I focus on two types of
quality changes: intersectoral changes and intrasectoral
changes.
Intersectoral quality changes arise from shifts in the
composition of production across sectors. These shifts
change average labor quality because labor quality varies
by sector. For example, agricultural workers at the time of
the Great Depression were less skilled, on average, than
manufacturing workers. Kendrick’s labor measure adjusts
for this source of quality change by multiplying sectoral
hours by the sectoral wage.
Intrasectoral quality changes arise from changes in the
averagequalityofworkerswithinsectors.Kendrick’slabor
measure does not adjust for this type of quality change.
But we can get a rough idea of its size from other studies.
Stanley Lebergott (1993) reports that employee quality
rose during the Depression; employment loss was concen-
trated among low-wage workers, and the most productive
workers worked the longest shifts. This suggests that the
average quality of individuals who continued to work dur-
ing the Depression was higher than the average quality of
individuals working before the Depression. Harold Cole
and I (2001) use macroeconomic data to estimate how
much measured wages were biased upward by layoffs of
low-wage workers during the Depression. That estimate
suggests that the quality of workers may have increased as
much as 15–18 percent during this period (Cole and
Ohanian 2001, p. 204). Lebergott (1993) also reports
microeconomic data suggesting that the average quality of
workers at the two largest ﬁrms in the electrical equipment
industry (General Electric and Westinghouse) rose about
10percentduring justtheﬁrsttwo yearsoftheDepression.
Given these estimates, I assume that average worker qual-
ity rose 7 percent during the Depression. This is a more
conservative adjustment than either of the two preceding
estimates and thus will produce a relatively small revision
to Kendrick’s TFP measure.
I recompute aggregate TFP with these capital and labor
adjustments. I ﬁnd that these adjustments explain only
about two percentage points of the 18 percent TFP de-
crease. This is because the change in labor input, multi-
plied by labor’s share, offsets much of the change in capi-
tal input, multiplied by capital’s relatively small share.
Production Shifts?
Since these factor mismeasurements do not explain much
of the decrease in aggregate TFP, I now examine sectoral
data to see if less-aggregated productivity measures also
fell during the Depression.
The ﬁrst column of numbers in Table 2 shows TFP
values in 1933 relative to TFP values in 1929, for the ﬁve
sectors Kendrick reports. These ﬁve sectors account for
about half of 1929 GNP. The data show that these sectoralproductivities fell during the Depression much less than
aggregate productivity did. Manufacturing and railroads
are the only sectors that show substantial TFP declines,
and these declines are only about half as large as the de-
cline in aggregate TFP.
Thefact thataggregate productivityfell morethanthese
sectoralproductivitiesraisesthepossibilitythatshiftsinthe
composition of production from sectors with a high value
ofmarginal productto sectorswith alow valueof marginal
product contributed to the aggregate TFP decrease. Labor
and relative wage data are also consistent with this view.
The second column of numbers in Table 2 shows the level
of sectoral hours worked in 1933 relative to its level in
1929,whilethethirdcolumnshowsthe1929averagewage
in the sector relative to the 1929 average wage in all sec-
tors. These labor and wage data show that the agricultural
sector, which pays relatively low wages, had only small
declines during the Depression, while the manufacturing
and mining sectors, which pay relatively high wages, both
had substantial declines.
How much did these shifts in the composition of output
decrease aggregate TFP? Kendrick tries to correct his ag-
gregate TFP measure for the effect of compositional shifts
by multiplying sectoral inputs by sectoral factor prices. He
estimates that compositional shifts reduced aggregate TFP
by about 2.5 percent. Without the compositional correc-
tion, Kendrick’s aggregate TFP measure would have de-
creased 20.5 percent rather than 18 percent.
Kendrick’s 2.5 percent adjustment seems small, how-
ever, relative to the large expansion of the low-value ag-
ricultural sector. As a robustness check, I independently
estimate the size of the compositional effect. I begin by
constructing a model to understand the connection be-
tween sectoral productivities and aggregate TFP. The
model speciﬁes that sectoral outputs Yi are produced from
constant returns to scale production functions using capital
Ki and labor Li that differ only by their TFP level. The
TFP is denoted by Ait:
(1) Yit = AitF(Kit,Lit).
Aggregate output is the sum of sectoral outputs multi-
plied by base-year sectoral prices, which are denoted as pi:
(2) Yt =
ipiYit.
With these assumptions, aggregate TFP is a weighted
average of sectoral productivities multiplied by relative





This equation can be used with price, productivity, and
labor data to estimate the compositional effect. To make
that estimate, however, I need a proxy for the relative price
term. I substitute for this term using wage data. I use this
proxy since proﬁt maximization implies that a sector’s
relative price is equal to the sector’s relative wage divided
by the sector’s marginal product of labor. Unfortunately,
the data required to construct the marginal products are not
all available, so I use the relative wage as a proxy for the
relative price. This proxy will overstate the compositional
effect because the marginal product of labor is probably
above average in high-wage sectors.
I now estimate the effect of compositional shifts by cal-
culatingaggregateTFPholdingsectoralproductivitylevels
ﬁxed at their 1929 levels and changing labor inputs as in
the data. (I use employment and wage data for all sectors
from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975.) I estimate that be-
tween 1929 and 1933, changes in the composition of pro-
duction reduced aggregate TFP about 4.5 percent. Since
this estimate is probably biased upward, it seems unlikely
that the compositional effect is bigger than Kendrick’s 2.5
percent correction.
This analysis suggests that Kendrick’s measure of ag-
gregate TFP adequately corrects for the effect of compo-
sitional shifts and that the sectors for which Kendrick does
not report productivity (construction, ﬁnance/insurance/
realestate,services,wholesaleandretailtrade,andgovern-
ment) account for most of the 18 percent decrease in ag-
gregate TFP. That is, the residual productivity decrease is
likely due to lower productivity in these omitted, or re-
sidual, sectors. The other possible cause, a compositional
shift from the highest to the lowest valued-added sectors
within the residual group, is unlikely because wage dif-
ferences are small in these sectors. This suggests that ac-
countingforthe18percentaggregateproductivitydecrease
requires that productivity fell more than 25 percent, on av-
erage, in Kendrick’s residual sectors.
Labor Hoarding? Increasing Returns?
Why did productivity fall so much during the Great De-
pression insomesectors (manufacturing,railroads,andthe
residual sectors) but not in others? I now brieﬂy consider
two other possible explanations, which have been cited by
Ben Bernanke and Martin Parkinson (1991) and others:
labor hoarding and increasing returns to scale.
Economists have often advanced labor hoarding as an
explanation for low productivity during run-of-the-mill re-
cessions. (See, for example, the 1986 work of Lawrence
Summers.) The standard labor hoarding thesis is that the
ﬁring and hiring costs associated with temporary layoffs
exceed the cost of hoarding workers, that is, not laying off
workers but instead reducing their utilization relative to
paidhours.Thisutilizationdecreasereducesmeasuredpro-
ductivity.
The duration of the Depression, however, raises ques-
tions about the plausibility of the labor hoarding explana-
tion. It is difficult to reconcile this thesis, which is based
on the temporary nature of recessions, with a major de-
pression that lasted well over a decade. It seems unlikely
that ﬁrms hoarded workers because they mistakenly ex-
pected the Depression to end quickly; consumption data
suggest that it was expected to last a long time. Purchases
of nondurable goods and services fell sharply during the
ﬁrst year of the Depression. Viewed through the lens of
Milton Friedman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis,
this large decrease indicates that households thought their
permanent income had fallen signiﬁcantly at the start of
the Depression. This is consistent with a large and very
persistent negative shock, rather than a transitory shock.
A challenge for those who hold the labor hoarding view
is to explain why ﬁrms hoarded labor during such a long
and deep depression and why labor hoarding did not af-
fect all sectors.Increasing returns to scale is another commonly offered
explanation for low productivity during recessions. This
idea is that with increasing returns, a reduction in factor in-
puts will show up as lower productivity under a standard
Solow residual accounting exercise based on constant re-
turns. Recent econometric studies, however, estimate con-
stant returns to scale at both aggregated and disaggregated
levels with small standard errors. (See, for example, the
1997 work of Susanto Basu and John Fernald.) These ﬁnd-
ings are strong evidence against big increasing returns and
suggest that only about three percentage points of the 18
percent productivity decrease could be plausibly explained
by this factor.
A Promising Explanation
In summary, I ﬁnd that all ﬁve of the traditionally suggest-
edfactorscombinedaccountforonlyaboutﬁvepercentage
points of the 18 percent productivity decrease during the
Great Depression (two points from capital and labor input
changes and three points from increasing returns). This
leads me to consider an alternative view, that lower pro-
duction efficiency contributed to the productivity decrease.
Efficiency may have been reduced by a decrease in or-
ganization capital, the knowledge ﬁrms use to organize
production (as discussed in 1980 by Edward Prescott and
Michael Visscher). Changes in organization capital might
be a promising explanation because this factor is quantita-
tively important, and it plausibly may have fallen during
the Depression.
Regardingitsquantitativeimportance,AndrewAtkeson
and Patrick Kehoe (2001) use a version of the neoclassical
growthmodeltomeasureorganizationcapitalintheUnited
States, and they estimate that in 1959–99 it was roughly
two-thirds of the value of the total physical capital stock.
There are several reasons this large stock of capital could
have shrunk during the Depression, including breakdowns
in supplier relationships that led to changes in production
plans and breakdowns in customer relationships that led to
changes in marketing, distribution, and inventory plans.
These breakdowns could have reduced efficiency by
leading managers to shift time away from production and
into search activities. For example, the failures of inter-
mediate-good suppliers could have reduced efficiency by
requiringmanagerstosearchfornewsuppliers.Thissearch
activity would have lowered efficiency by reducing the
amount of managerial labor input dedicated to organizing
and planning production. Similar reasoning suggests that
the failures of either wholesalers or retail customers could
have reduced efficiency by leading managers to substitute
out of production and into search activities.
Breakdowns in these relationships could have also re-
duced efficiency by leading ﬁrms to adopt different tech-
nologies that initially were operated inefficiently. Atkeson
and Kehoe (2001) present manufacturing plant-level data
that support this hypothesis. They ﬁnd that the productivity
of plants adopting leading-edge technologies is initially
lower than the productivity of much older plants. This sug-
gests that organization capital is technology-speciﬁc and
that ﬁrms must accumulate new organization capital to op-
erate new technologies efficiently.
Conclusion
The usual suspects for explaining procyclical productivity
(changes in capital utilization, changes in the quality of
factor inputs, shifts in production from high-productivity
to low-productivity sectors, labor hoarding, and increasing
returns to scale) explain only about ﬁve percentage points
of the 18 percent decrease in aggregate productivity dur-
ing 1929–33. I conclude that the Great Depression pro-
ductivity puzzle remains largely unsolved.
This analysis suggests two alternative interpretations of
the productivity puzzle. One interpretation is that some
forms of measurement error are responsible for the pro-
ductivity decreases. Measurement error hypotheses tend to
raise two possibilities: either output fell signiﬁcantly less
than measured, which would imply that the Depression
waslessseverethanpreviouslythought,orinputsfellmore
than measured, which would deepen the puzzle of why
employment fell so much during the Depression.
The other interpretation of the productivity puzzle is
that lower production efficiency contributed to the produc-
tivity decreases. A version of this lower efficiency view is
thattheDepressionreducedﬁrm-speciﬁcorganizationcap-
ital by disrupting normal production, distribution, market-
ing, and inventory plans.
Thesedifferentinterpretationsoftheproductivitypuzzle
suggest very different views about the nature of the Great
Depression. Thus, solving this puzzle may considerably
advanceourunderstandingofthisfascinatingperiod.More
research is needed, however, to determine how much of
theDepression’s productivitydecreaseisdue tochangesin
efficiency, through either lower organization capital or
other shocks to efficiency, and how much is due to mea-
surement error or other factors. A major challenge is to
explain not only why measured productivity fell, but also
why productivity change varied so much across sectors.
*This article is reprinted, with permission, from the American Economic Review
(May 2001, vol. 91, no. 2, pp. 34–38). © 2001 by the American Economic Associa-
tion. The article was edited for publication in the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Quarterly Review.
This study was undertaken to honor Stanley Engerman’s distinguished career,
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of long-run productivity change. See, for example, the 2000 work of Engerman with
Kenneth Sokoloff.
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A Measure of U.S. Aggregate Productivity
and Its Components
During the Great Depression
Value in Each Year as % of 1929 Value
Year       Output      Capital     Labor*        TFP**
1930         89.6%      102.5%      92.7%        94.2%
1931         80.7        103.2          83.7         91.2
1932         66.9         101.4         73.3         83.4
1933        65.3         98.4         73.5         81.9
*Labor here is employment.
**Total factor productivity is the ratio of real gross national
product to an index of total factor input. That index is a factor 
share–weighted average of aggregate capital and labor input.
Source: Kendrick 1961, p. 329Table 2
A Sectoral View of Productivity and Production
During the Great Depression
Manufacturing             91.5%         59.4% 127.2%                
Farming                    104.5             97.4                       38.2
Mining                      99.5           54.4                 162.5
Railroads                    90.2           51.3                   119.7
Communications
and Public Utilities    100.9             67.6                     114.3
Aggregate                  81.9%        73.5%                   —
*Manufacturing and mining TFP values are estimated from Kendrick 1961, assuming
that each sector’s capital stock did not change between 1929 and 1933.
**Labor is “manhours” (employment x average hours worked per employee) for the
sectors and employment for the aggregate.
†Relative wages for each sector as a percentage of the aggregate wage are estimated
as the ratio of Kendrick’s measure of labor input (the product of “manhours” and the
relative value of the sector’s output) to “manhours.”




1933 Value as % of 1929 Value
Sector                          TFP*         Labor**